Sergey Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, was the moderator of the session. In his opening remarks, he addressed the necessity of designing alternative approaches to the current arms control system.
Dmitry Trenin, Research Director of the Institute of World Military Economy and Strategy at the HSE University, outlined the tendencies pertaining to the multipolar nuclear world. First, arms control is a product of a global political equilibrium which existed in the late 1960s but can hardly be observed presently given the turbulent environment. Second, unlike in the Cold War when stability was defined by the two players (namely, Moscow and Washington), the situation of bilateral nuclear parity is in a sharp contrast with the (non-)nuclear disparity with a larger number of nuclear powers and a more significant role of conventional deterrence. Thirdly, strategic stability has traditionally been understood in a military sense, however, at the moment the strategic dialogue between Russia and the US seems barely probable while the dialogue between the US and China appears barely productive. Dr. Trenin divided strategic deterrenceinto three components: military, spatial and coalitional. It was the failure in the spatial deterrence that led to the conflict around Ukraine. This is why nuclear deterrence could be complemented by nuclear intimidation, which does not mean abandoning the dialogue between the nuclear powers. Another recommendation entails the creation of a system of coalitions – as opposed to blocs or alliances – to ensure Eurasian security (possibly without the Western part of the continent at first). Finally, another suggestion concerns the development of indigenous models of a nuclear world rather than translation of the existing US concepts.
Rose Gottemoeller, Fellow at the Center of International Security and Cooperation and a seasoned US diplomat, joined the event online to present her vision of the challenges in the field of strategic stability. She reiterated a word combination from the preamble to the “New START”: that of “indivisible security”. Ms. Gottemoeller argued that from a nuclear arithmetic standpoint, the US will need 3,051 deployed nuclear warheads to deter both Russia and China with the latter presumably expanding its nuclear arsenal projected to reach 1,500 by 2035. In response, Washington continues its vast modernisation of strategic nuclear forces: this programme is projected to continue for decades. Ms. Gottemoeller underscored that the “New START” is to expire in February 2026, calling upon the Presidents of both the US and Russia to issue a declaration on adherence to its principles in early 2026, in line with the ongoing NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) review process.
Alexey Arbatov, Head of the Center for International Security at Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), shared his concerns with regard to the nuclear security situation between Russia and the Western countries. The configuration is becoming increasingly complicated against the background of nuclear weapons proliferation, Russia-Ukraine conflict, tensions between Moscow and the Western countries and emerging technologies. Besides, the current arms control system is barely dismantled and many treaties related to nuclear issues have been on the verge of collapse. Even worse than that, the possibility of using nuclear weapons in real war is getting higher. Many concepts like “limited nuclear war” and “tactical nuclear weapons” have been brought up more often in recent years. While, if the Pandora’s box of using nuclear weapons is open, every state will lose. So it is imperative to solve the Russia-Ukraine conflict in a peaceful way given that any escalation can lead to a nuclear war. With the presence of nine nuclear-weapon-states, a question arises if we will witness more nuclear powers in the future. The truth is, the proliferation of nuclear weapons will only bring this world more chaos and crisis. The strengthening of the NPT is crucial for our global security. If the nuclear arsenals keep growing, the international security will be in greater danger. As for the solutions, obviously, rebuilding multilateral treaties is very important, but it is rather hard to put many states with different quality and quantity of nuclear weapons at the same negotiations table. This world needs more efforts from the nuclear powers to control the nuclear proliferation and maintain strategic stability.
Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (India), talked about difference of a polycentric world from a polycentric nuclear world. Polycentric world is better because than international system would be based less on hegemony and monopoly. In the current international system, emergence of a polycentric system is only normal because of the power fracture. For a country to become a pole, nuclear weapons are not essential, rather economic power and political power with an ability to provide an ethical alternative are of importance. As can be proven on the example of DPRK, nuclear weapons do not provide the capacity to be a pole. During the Cold War, arms race was happening yet both superpowers had the desire to establish restraint. In the contemporary situation nuclear deterrence is becoming dispensable. However, second strike capability has make it difficult for states to opt for nuclear war. Thus, options below nuclear overhang are being explored. Moreover, there is deep erosion of arms control and disarmament, wherein there is little progress on the formulation of new treaties. Recent NPT Review Conference has achieved nothing, while the TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) has not got any attention because of genuine concern on its objectives. Conference on Disarmament is the only appropriate forum to discuss these issues because of equal representation. If nuclear modernisation is analysed in major powers, the trend reflects that they have definitely not acted in “good faith”. Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty would only become a success if it is based on Shannon Mandate. Today there is new debate on space weapons, complicated situation is arising between P5 because of lack of consensus even on the terminology and definitions. The impact of hypersonic weapons, AI (artificial intelligence) and cyber threats cannot be ignored. A positive development in this regard is the UN GA (United Nations General Assembly) Global Resolution on AI; but a key question in this regard – whether AI can detect false alarms and what the long-term implications of AI to cause accidental war are – needs further research and funding. China is also another important actor in polycentric nuclear order, whose no-first-use posture could change because of its contradictory military modernisation.
Feodor Voitolovsky, Director of the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), dwelled on a wider political-economic and military technology context of the term “polycentric nuclear world”. The system has several components: 1) It is deeply intertwined with the concept of retaliatory strike that makes it possible to deal unacceptable damage. Before 2026, Russia and the US will adhere to the nuclear weapons caps, but the question is what comes next. Washington, having a higher breakout potential, will likely practice its dual deterrence against Russia and China in the short-term. In the long-term, it will keep modernise its nuclear arsenal (1.7 trillion USD have already been allotted for this purpose). 2) Early warning systems and adjacent elements are connected with the survivability issue. Space capabilities are improving, which leads to a lower security and increased detectability of strategic nuclear weapons. Thus, the technological developments stimulate the arms race. 3) Distribution of power in the sphere of conventional arms (high-precision weapons, strategic non-nuclear systems, unmanned vehicles etc.) erodes stability and creates risks. 4) World politics also influences the conundrum, namely, the Ukrainian crisis. Using proxies and declaring other side’s strategic defeat as a goal leads to an impossibility of a dialogue, including between the US and China. The latter relies upon its intermediate-range missile systems as a means of deterrence. The US wants to deploy its analogous systems coupled with sea-based systems in Asia, which deprives China of the motivation to start a dialogue (the only exception being expert consultations). All of this minimises the feasibility of a trilateral dialogue, too. Still, nuclear weapons remain a considerable factor preventing the escalation and stabilising NATO-Russia relations. Sooner or later, a compromise would be sought for.
The meeting turned out to be the only session of the day to be followed by a Q&A part, which assisted in providing the feedback from the audience. Answering the question about the potential of an unformalised dialogue, Dr. Arbatov admitted that this is possible in principle citing the example of Presidential initiatives in the bilateral dialogue on substantially lowering the number of tactical nuclear weapons in 1991–1992. The process did not even entail a verification system. However, these processes, warned Alexei Arbatov, can be easily reversed.
Dr. Arbatov also commented on the concept of “limited nuclear war” that has long been embedded in the doctrinal documents of various countries. Nuclear war doctrine was denied both in the Soviet Union and Russia as its immediate successor. It is irresponsible on the part of certain Russian experts to promote the idea of a nuclear operation, which still does not preclude the probability of amendments in the nuclear doctrine. Conspicuously, NATO saw the concept of a “limited nuclear war” as if in the mirror, which made an impression on them as it is less and less frequently used in the US or NATO.
Dr. Trenin elaborated on the concept of nuclear coalitions saying that Russia – only being accompanied by Belarus – faces around 50 states headed by the US. This explains the need for interacting with other states that share Moscow’s concerns. Those include North Korea, China with the military cooperation, while a treaty with Iran is in the process of preparation. Russia is not trying to build new alliances, just utilising the available resources. The reason for that is the confrontation between Russia and the US, unlike the Cold War standoff. The discussion about the nuclear opportunities is not irresponsible if the opponents do not want to listen. As such, the goal is to create barriers in their minds. Deterrence is based on conviction and real threat, and the latter could appear in the forefront if the former does not work.
Ms. Gottemoeller in her closing statement assured in turn that the US takes the signals from Russia on the necessity of persuading the opponents very seriously. In her view, this is the right moment for discussion and direct consultations. Dr. Voitolovsky added that if nuclear or strategic deterrence were to fail, NATO troops would already end up in Ukraine which would have led to a direct armed clash. The US, according to him, extrapolate the logic of a market to the international relations, aiming at increasing the costs for Russia. Nevertheless, the US is not ready for bearing unacceptable costs themselves, which contributes to deterrence. At the same time, Deputy Minister Ryabkov expressed the opinion that only terminology is left in the US when it comes to market, while the rest is represented by ideology and perceptions.
Summing up, this session of the 2024 Primakov Readings yet again proved the invaluable significance of Track 1.5 dialogue among both acting diplomats and leading experts. Such high profile events play a vital role in preventing the uncontrollable escalation of the ongoing acute international crises.
Gleb Toropchin, Novosibirsk State Technical University, Russia
Ahyousha Khan, Strategic Vision Institute, Pakistan
Evgeny Silivanov, Far Eastern Federal University, Russia
Ying Li, Tsinghua University, China
Dmitry Trenin, Research Director of the Institute of World Military Economy and Strategy at the HSE University, outlined the tendencies pertaining to the multipolar nuclear world. First, arms control is a product of a global political equilibrium which existed in the late 1960s but can hardly be observed presently given the turbulent environment. Second, unlike in the Cold War when stability was defined by the two players (namely, Moscow and Washington), the situation of bilateral nuclear parity is in a sharp contrast with the (non-)nuclear disparity with a larger number of nuclear powers and a more significant role of conventional deterrence. Thirdly, strategic stability has traditionally been understood in a military sense, however, at the moment the strategic dialogue between Russia and the US seems barely probable while the dialogue between the US and China appears barely productive. Dr. Trenin divided strategic deterrenceinto three components: military, spatial and coalitional. It was the failure in the spatial deterrence that led to the conflict around Ukraine. This is why nuclear deterrence could be complemented by nuclear intimidation, which does not mean abandoning the dialogue between the nuclear powers. Another recommendation entails the creation of a system of coalitions – as opposed to blocs or alliances – to ensure Eurasian security (possibly without the Western part of the continent at first). Finally, another suggestion concerns the development of indigenous models of a nuclear world rather than translation of the existing US concepts.
Rose Gottemoeller, Fellow at the Center of International Security and Cooperation and a seasoned US diplomat, joined the event online to present her vision of the challenges in the field of strategic stability. She reiterated a word combination from the preamble to the “New START”: that of “indivisible security”. Ms. Gottemoeller argued that from a nuclear arithmetic standpoint, the US will need 3,051 deployed nuclear warheads to deter both Russia and China with the latter presumably expanding its nuclear arsenal projected to reach 1,500 by 2035. In response, Washington continues its vast modernisation of strategic nuclear forces: this programme is projected to continue for decades. Ms. Gottemoeller underscored that the “New START” is to expire in February 2026, calling upon the Presidents of both the US and Russia to issue a declaration on adherence to its principles in early 2026, in line with the ongoing NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) review process.
Alexey Arbatov, Head of the Center for International Security at Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), shared his concerns with regard to the nuclear security situation between Russia and the Western countries. The configuration is becoming increasingly complicated against the background of nuclear weapons proliferation, Russia-Ukraine conflict, tensions between Moscow and the Western countries and emerging technologies. Besides, the current arms control system is barely dismantled and many treaties related to nuclear issues have been on the verge of collapse. Even worse than that, the possibility of using nuclear weapons in real war is getting higher. Many concepts like “limited nuclear war” and “tactical nuclear weapons” have been brought up more often in recent years. While, if the Pandora’s box of using nuclear weapons is open, every state will lose. So it is imperative to solve the Russia-Ukraine conflict in a peaceful way given that any escalation can lead to a nuclear war. With the presence of nine nuclear-weapon-states, a question arises if we will witness more nuclear powers in the future. The truth is, the proliferation of nuclear weapons will only bring this world more chaos and crisis. The strengthening of the NPT is crucial for our global security. If the nuclear arsenals keep growing, the international security will be in greater danger. As for the solutions, obviously, rebuilding multilateral treaties is very important, but it is rather hard to put many states with different quality and quantity of nuclear weapons at the same negotiations table. This world needs more efforts from the nuclear powers to control the nuclear proliferation and maintain strategic stability.
Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (India), talked about difference of a polycentric world from a polycentric nuclear world. Polycentric world is better because than international system would be based less on hegemony and monopoly. In the current international system, emergence of a polycentric system is only normal because of the power fracture. For a country to become a pole, nuclear weapons are not essential, rather economic power and political power with an ability to provide an ethical alternative are of importance. As can be proven on the example of DPRK, nuclear weapons do not provide the capacity to be a pole. During the Cold War, arms race was happening yet both superpowers had the desire to establish restraint. In the contemporary situation nuclear deterrence is becoming dispensable. However, second strike capability has make it difficult for states to opt for nuclear war. Thus, options below nuclear overhang are being explored. Moreover, there is deep erosion of arms control and disarmament, wherein there is little progress on the formulation of new treaties. Recent NPT Review Conference has achieved nothing, while the TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) has not got any attention because of genuine concern on its objectives. Conference on Disarmament is the only appropriate forum to discuss these issues because of equal representation. If nuclear modernisation is analysed in major powers, the trend reflects that they have definitely not acted in “good faith”. Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty would only become a success if it is based on Shannon Mandate. Today there is new debate on space weapons, complicated situation is arising between P5 because of lack of consensus even on the terminology and definitions. The impact of hypersonic weapons, AI (artificial intelligence) and cyber threats cannot be ignored. A positive development in this regard is the UN GA (United Nations General Assembly) Global Resolution on AI; but a key question in this regard – whether AI can detect false alarms and what the long-term implications of AI to cause accidental war are – needs further research and funding. China is also another important actor in polycentric nuclear order, whose no-first-use posture could change because of its contradictory military modernisation.
Feodor Voitolovsky, Director of the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), dwelled on a wider political-economic and military technology context of the term “polycentric nuclear world”. The system has several components: 1) It is deeply intertwined with the concept of retaliatory strike that makes it possible to deal unacceptable damage. Before 2026, Russia and the US will adhere to the nuclear weapons caps, but the question is what comes next. Washington, having a higher breakout potential, will likely practice its dual deterrence against Russia and China in the short-term. In the long-term, it will keep modernise its nuclear arsenal (1.7 trillion USD have already been allotted for this purpose). 2) Early warning systems and adjacent elements are connected with the survivability issue. Space capabilities are improving, which leads to a lower security and increased detectability of strategic nuclear weapons. Thus, the technological developments stimulate the arms race. 3) Distribution of power in the sphere of conventional arms (high-precision weapons, strategic non-nuclear systems, unmanned vehicles etc.) erodes stability and creates risks. 4) World politics also influences the conundrum, namely, the Ukrainian crisis. Using proxies and declaring other side’s strategic defeat as a goal leads to an impossibility of a dialogue, including between the US and China. The latter relies upon its intermediate-range missile systems as a means of deterrence. The US wants to deploy its analogous systems coupled with sea-based systems in Asia, which deprives China of the motivation to start a dialogue (the only exception being expert consultations). All of this minimises the feasibility of a trilateral dialogue, too. Still, nuclear weapons remain a considerable factor preventing the escalation and stabilising NATO-Russia relations. Sooner or later, a compromise would be sought for.
The meeting turned out to be the only session of the day to be followed by a Q&A part, which assisted in providing the feedback from the audience. Answering the question about the potential of an unformalised dialogue, Dr. Arbatov admitted that this is possible in principle citing the example of Presidential initiatives in the bilateral dialogue on substantially lowering the number of tactical nuclear weapons in 1991–1992. The process did not even entail a verification system. However, these processes, warned Alexei Arbatov, can be easily reversed.
Dr. Arbatov also commented on the concept of “limited nuclear war” that has long been embedded in the doctrinal documents of various countries. Nuclear war doctrine was denied both in the Soviet Union and Russia as its immediate successor. It is irresponsible on the part of certain Russian experts to promote the idea of a nuclear operation, which still does not preclude the probability of amendments in the nuclear doctrine. Conspicuously, NATO saw the concept of a “limited nuclear war” as if in the mirror, which made an impression on them as it is less and less frequently used in the US or NATO.
Dr. Trenin elaborated on the concept of nuclear coalitions saying that Russia – only being accompanied by Belarus – faces around 50 states headed by the US. This explains the need for interacting with other states that share Moscow’s concerns. Those include North Korea, China with the military cooperation, while a treaty with Iran is in the process of preparation. Russia is not trying to build new alliances, just utilising the available resources. The reason for that is the confrontation between Russia and the US, unlike the Cold War standoff. The discussion about the nuclear opportunities is not irresponsible if the opponents do not want to listen. As such, the goal is to create barriers in their minds. Deterrence is based on conviction and real threat, and the latter could appear in the forefront if the former does not work.
Ms. Gottemoeller in her closing statement assured in turn that the US takes the signals from Russia on the necessity of persuading the opponents very seriously. In her view, this is the right moment for discussion and direct consultations. Dr. Voitolovsky added that if nuclear or strategic deterrence were to fail, NATO troops would already end up in Ukraine which would have led to a direct armed clash. The US, according to him, extrapolate the logic of a market to the international relations, aiming at increasing the costs for Russia. Nevertheless, the US is not ready for bearing unacceptable costs themselves, which contributes to deterrence. At the same time, Deputy Minister Ryabkov expressed the opinion that only terminology is left in the US when it comes to market, while the rest is represented by ideology and perceptions.
Summing up, this session of the 2024 Primakov Readings yet again proved the invaluable significance of Track 1.5 dialogue among both acting diplomats and leading experts. Such high profile events play a vital role in preventing the uncontrollable escalation of the ongoing acute international crises.
Gleb Toropchin, Novosibirsk State Technical University, Russia
Ahyousha Khan, Strategic Vision Institute, Pakistan
Evgeny Silivanov, Far Eastern Federal University, Russia
Ying Li, Tsinghua University, China